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TO ATTAIN THE ENDS OF JUSTICE:
CONFRONTING VIRGINIA'S DEFAULT RULES IN CAPITAL CASES
BY: MICHAEL A. GROOT
I. SEEKING ONE FAIR HEARING OF FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS IN FEDERAL COURT
Given that appellate relief from the Supreme Court of Virginia in
capital cases is exceedingly rare,1 and relief through state habeas is like-
wise virtually non-existent,2 it is not surprising that death sentenced pris-
oners seek at least one fair determination by a federal court of their
claims of federal constitutional error. There are only two ways to achieve
federal review, and the first is almost never completely successful. The
first way is to completely avoid Virginia's labyrinthian default rules and
properly preserve every claim of error.3 The second method, the subject
of this article, is to convince a federal court to hear a claim in spite of
Virginia default rules.
II. THE IDEAL: SIMULTANEOUSLY DEFENDING AND
PROTECTING THE RECORD
Ideally, defense counsel at the guilt/innocence trial, while seeking an
acquittal or a conviction of a lesser offense, and at the penalty trial, while
seeking a life sentence instead of death:
(1) makes every objection, motion, proffer, and proposed
instruction in a timely fashion, and on the record; and
(2) clearly asserts for the trial court all available grounds, state
and federal, applicable to every adverse ruling on objections,
motions, proffers, and proposed instructions.
This must be- done because the default and waiver rules allow the
court to dismiss claims without judgment on the merits for purely proce-
dural error. Known as the contemporaneous objection rule, Rule 5:25, in
pertinent part, provides that "[e]rror will not be sustained to any ruling of
the trial court.., before which the case was initially tried unless the
objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling,
except for good cause shown or to enable [the Supreme Court of Virginia]
to attain the ends of justice.'
4
I See McInemey, The Virginia Supreme Court and Thirteen Years of
Death Sentence Review, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 30
(1991). At the time of the article, the Virginia Supreme Court had
reversed only seven of the over 75 cases it had heard. The court now has
heard over 95 cases but has only reversed on eight occasions. Perhaps
more significant, reversals are becoming increasingly rare. Since 1986,
the court has heard over 50 capital cases but reversed only twice, both on
state law grounds. Both Rogers v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 307, 410
S.E.2d 621 (1991), and Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26,393 S.E.2d
599 (1990), were reversed based on insufficiency of the evidence because
of Virginia's statutory "triggerman" rule, Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-18. The
"triggerman" rule provides that only the person who did the actual killing
may be convicted of capital murder and subjected to the penalty of exe-
cution.
2 There are only two cases in which the Supreme Court of Virginia
has given relief according to Michelle Brace of the Virginia Capital
Representation Resource Center.
3 See Powley, Perfecting The Record of a Capital Case in Virginia,
Beavers v. Commonwealth,5 is quite illustrative of the difficulty fac-
ing attorneys attempting to defend while simultaneously protecting the
record. In Beavers, the trial court ruled that defense counsel's motion to
strike the entire jury panel was defaulted. Defense counsel failed to object
at the time that each of three venire members were dismissed for cause.
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed that ruling, stating that the
objection was untimely because defense counsel waited until after the
jury had been selected, sworn, and preliminarily instructed.6 To avoid
default, said the court, counsel must object twice: first at the time the
potential juror is dismissed and again immediately before the jury is seat-
ed. Similarly, the court held that the defense defaulted on its motion for
a mistrial. During the Commonwealth's attorney's opening statement,
several references were made to "recommendations" to be made by the
jury regarding defendant's penalty. Defense counsel correctly objected to
those statements based on Caldwell v. Mississippi.7 Unfortunately,
defense counsel objected at the end of the entire statement. For an objec-
tion concerning opposing counsel's statements to be timely, said the
court, it is necessary to move for mistrial as soon as the prejudicial words
are uttered.
Usually, trial counsel has responsibility also for direct appeal of
right to the Supreme Court of Virginia in capital cases. 8 Ideally, appel-
late counsel:
(1) without "winnowing" out what she considers weaker
claims, 9 assigns as error all the non-frivolous claims that have
been so carefully preserved at trial; and
(2) briefs and argues all assigned errors before the Supreme
Court of Virginia.
This must be done because Rule 5:17(c), amended in 1991, applies
the provisions of Rule 5:25 to limit substantially the questions upon
which the supreme court will rule. "Only errors assigned in the petition
for appeal will be noticed ...."10 Furthermore, the Supreme Court of
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 26 (1990).
4 Va. R. Sup. Ct. 5:25 (emphasis added).
5 245 Va. 268, 427 S.E.2d 411 (1993); see also case summary of
Beavers, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 26 (1993).
6 Id. at 278, 427 S.E.2d at 418-19.
7 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (holding that an argument is subject to objec-
tion if the prosecutor attempts to diminish the jury's sense of responsibil-
ity for its decision).
8 Va. R. Sup. Ct. 5:22 (providing that an appeal of a death sentence
is automatically granted).
9 See Smith v. Dixon, 14 F.3d 956 (1994) (holding, inter alia, that
although an ineffective assistance claim was not barred, the claim did not
provide a basis for habeas relief); see also case summary of Smith,
Capital Defense Digest, this issue (pointing out that "winnowing" out
claims is unacceptable in capital appellate advocacy because it is not pos-
sible for counsel to determine what claims will be recognized as merito-
rious during the often lengthy pendency of the capital appellate process).
10 Va. R. Sup. Ct. 5:17(c).
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Virginia will not consider assignments of error which are waived by the
defendant's failure to argue them on brief.11 For example, in Stockton v.
Commonwealth,12 a capital case, the court rigorously applied the rule.
The court refused to grant the defendant's request to file a brief in excess
of a fifty page limitation set by Rule 5:26.13 Later, when the defendant
attempted to rely upon issues which he raised in assignments of error but
did not brief because of the page limitation, the court adhered to Rule
5:27 (now Rule 5:17(c)(4)) and refused to hear the issues.
When a case reaches state habeas, new counsel is ordinarily
assigned. Her job is to preserve for federal review on the merits all the
claims rejected by the Supreme Court of Virginia on direct appeal. 14 In
addition, there are claims which can only be brought before the court at
state habeas because the grounds become available or can reasonably be
discovered for the first time at state habeas. The most common of these
claims are those arising from the ineffective assistance of counsel,
11 Va. R. Sup. Ct. 5:17(c)(4).
12 241 Va. 192, 402 S.E.2d 196 (1991); see case summary of
Stockton, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 18 (1991).
13 Id. at 217, 402 S.E.2d at 210.
14 One way to preserve claims is not to present these claims at all in
state habeas. See Spencer v. Murray, 5 F.3d 758 (4th Cir. 1993); see also
case summary of Spencer (Spencer 1), Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
In Spencer I, the court made it clear that claims presented to the Supreme
Court of Virginia and rejected on direct appeal remained procedurally eli-
gible to be considered on the merits by federal habeas courts. Bypassing
state habeas has several distinct advantages: First, any further findings of
fact necessary to the claim will be made by the federal court, as opposed
to the circuit court at state habeas. At least as to those facts then, there is
not the problem of the requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) that the
federal court defer to state court findings of fact. Second, the common
assertion by the Commonwealth that the claim is defaulted because it is
not the same claim that was rejected on direct appeal will be decided ini-
tially by the federal court, rather than by a state court that often has a vest-
ed interest in preserving the trial results. Obviously, however, before
bypassing state habeas, defense counsel should ensure that the claim is
indeed protected by the holding of Spencer .
15 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that due process
is violated when material and exculpatory evidence is withheld from
defendant).
16 See Hobart, State Habeas in Virginia: A Critical Transition,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 23 (1990); see also Coleman v.
Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) and case summary of Coleman,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 4 (1991). In Coleman, the peti-
tioner was three days late in filing a notice of appeal back to the circuit
court which first examined his state habeas petition. The Commonwealth
filed a motion to dismiss petitioner's appeal on the ground that it violat-
ed Rule 5:9 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia which provid-
ed that no appeal shall be allowed unless a notice of appeal is filed with
the trial court within thirty days of final judgment. The Supreme Court
of Virginia eventually dismissed petitioner's appeal. The United States
Supreme Court held that the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision "fair-
ly appears" to rest primarily on state law because the dismissal does not
mention federal law and because the underlying dismissal motion was
based solely upon state procedural grounds of failure to give timely notice
of appeal.
Brady15 violations, and prosecutorial, judicial or law enforcement miscon-
duct. These must be investigated and presented to the circuit court with the
same competence and care as were trial level claims and their denial musi
be appealed back to the Supreme Court of Virginia, following the same
rules outlined for direct appeal.
16
Fashioning a perfect record under these circumstances is one way to
insure that claims of fundamental constitutional error resulting in a death
sentence are at least reviewed on their merits in federal court. Every efforl
should be made simultaneously -to defend and protect the record, but it is
understandable that this goal will not be reached in every case. In fact,
Virginia capital litigation history reveals that it is seldom achieved.17
Because of the importance of meaningful appellate review, every avenue tc
achieve it should be explored. What, then, can be done if the case has
reached the door of federal court and some claims appear not to have sur-
vived the pitfalls of Virginia default and waiver doctrine?
17 See Swann v. Commonwealth, 441 S.E. 2d 195 (Va. 1994) (claims
that trial court improperly sustained prosecutor's objection to counsel's
closing argument that the jury could assume that a life sentence meant a
prison term for life; that the court allowed a witness to state that defen-
dant's prior releases from prison were due to "mandatory release"; claim
of error under Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), due to pros-
ecutor's attempt to diminish jury's sense of responsibility for its decision;
and claim of violation of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965),
where prosecutor referred to defendant's invoking right not to testify
against himself was defaulted). See also case summary of Swann, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue; see also Beavers, supra (claims regarding
motion to strike jury panel and motion for mistrial under Caldwell were
defaulted); Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121,410 S.E.2d 254 (1991)
(claims that the admission of a post-sentence psychiatric report which
equated dangerousness with low intelligence as evidence of future dan-
gerousness and motion for mistrial were defaulted); Quisenberry v.
Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 402 S.E.2d 218 (1991) (claim involving
objection to court's definitions of terms seconds after definitions were
given was defaulted along with four substantive issues); George v.
Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 411 S.E.2d 12 (1991) (claim for sentence
review for passion and prejudice because verdict improperly influenced
in part because a charge of abduction with intent to defile was consoli-
dated for trial with the capital murder charge was defaulted); Justus v.
Murray, 897 F.2d 709 (1990) (claim involving sufficiency of the evi-
dence supporting his death sentence was defaulted); Spencer v.
Commonwealth, 238 Va. 563, 385 S.E.2d 850 (1989) (claims that the
death penalty statute was "vague" and does not specify which party car-
ries the burden of proof of mitigation were defaulted); and Fisher v.
Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 374 S.E.2d 46 (1988) (claims regarding
trial court's refusal to grant defense requests for statements made by
defendant to informants; objections to cameras in the courtroom; consti-
tutionality of Code § 18.2-31(h) which classified murder for hire as cap-
ital murder; constitutionality of Code §§ 18.2-18 and 18.2-31(b) which
permitted an accessory before the fact in a murder for hire to be prose-
cuted for capital murder; constitutionality of Code § 19.2-264.2, which
prescribes criteria which must be met before the death penalty may be
imposed; and court's failure to notice on its own motion certain com-
ments made by the Commonwealth's attorney in his closing statement
were defaulted).
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II. FEDERAL COURTS AND DEFAULTED STATE
CLAIMS: COMITY, FEDERALISM, AND "ADEQUATE
AND INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS"
Claims which have not properly been presented in accordance with
state procedure are not necessarily barred from federal review. Such
claims are not jurisdictional and may be heard by federal courts.
Persuading the federal court to hear defaulted constitutional claims in cap-
ital cases is most often attempted in two ways: first, by showing a good
reason or "cause" for the failure to follow state procedure, and demon-
strating the harm or "prejudice" caused by the constitutional error; second,
by demonstrating that, but for the error, petitioner could not lawfully have
been exposed to a sentence of death. These methods are further described
in this section.
A third means of seeking a determination of claims on their merits
also exists-challenging the unjust and uneven application of state proce-
dural bars. It is this avenue that appears to be underutilized. The federal
doctrine permitting review under these circumstances is described in this
section. The apparent vulnerability of Virginia on this issue is the subject
of this article's next section.
First, the "cause" and "prejudice" excuses for default stem from
Wainwright v. Sykes. 18 In Sykes, the Court held that if the petitioner has
failed to raise a claim in an adequate manner in the state courts, and the
state courts have for this reason refused to decide the merits of the claim,
the state courts' rulings are an independent and adequate state procedural
ground precluding the consideration of the claim in federal habeas, unless
the petitioner can show "cause" for the default and "prejudice" if the claim
is not considered.
Petitioner's default may occur at trial, in the failure to object, 19 or on
appeal, in the failure to raise an issue.20 Furthermore, petitioner's default
must have foreclosed review on the merits in the state courts. If the state
courts determine the issue on the merits despite the default, or if the state
courts' rulings are not clearly on procedural grounds and are arguably on
the merits, the Sykes rule does not apply.
2 1
Where the Sykes rule does apply, "cause" and "prejudice" must be
established in order to obtain review of a claim on the merits. "Cause"
may be shown "when a procedural default is not attributable to an inten-
tional decision by counsel made in pursuit of his client's interests."
22
Accordingly, "the existence of cause for a procedural default must ordi-
narily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor
external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the
State's procedural rule."2 3 "Cause" can be established by showing that the
factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel, 24
or "that 'some interference by officials' ... made compliance impractica-
ble."25 "Cause" cannot, however, be established by a showing of inad-
vertence (short of ineffective assistance) by counsel,2 6 or by a showing
that state law was so well established against the claim that any attempt to
18 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
19 Id.
20 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
21 See Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979). See also
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S.
107 (1982); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,582 n.19 (1980). But see
Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (1991); see also case summary of
Smith v. Dixon, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
22 Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 14 (1984).
23 Murray, 477 U.S. at 488.
24 Id.; see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. at 16-18; Davis v. United
States, 411 U.S. 233, 243 (1972). But see, as to legal basis, Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (if the legal basis for a claim did not vrise
until after petitioner's trial and direct appeal, it may be of no avail at
habeas.)
raise it would have been futile.27 "Prejudice" can be shown if the peti-
tioner can establish that the underlying constitutional violation "worked
to his actual and substantial disadvantage .... '-28
Second, the "innocent of the death penalty" basis for hearing
defaulted claims was recently clarified in Sawyer v. Whitley.29 Under
Sawyer, another reason procedural default may not always be deadly to
capital defendants is the existence of a second excuse, actual "innocence
of the death penalty": 30 that is, innocence of the capital crime itself, or
non-existence of aggravating factors sufficient to support the death penal-
ty. The United States Supreme Court has held that to prove such a claim
"one must show by clear and convincing evidence that but for a constitu-
tional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible
for the death penalty under the applicable state law."3 1 Therefore, even
if cause and prejudice cannot be established, the petitioner can still avoid
the Sykes rule if she can show that a "fundamental miscarriage of justice"
will be sustained in the absence of federal habeas relief.
In the guilt/innocence context, where the petitioner can show that "a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one
who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even
in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default."'32 In the
capital sentencing context, if the constitutional error has allowed the sen-
tencer to consider "false or in any way misleading" testimony, or has
"had the effect of foreclosing meaningful exploration of [mitigating evi-
dence]," 3 3 the writ may be granted. Additionally, counsel should be
aware that "cause" and "prejudice" are generally fact-based issues which,
in the absence of fair hearing and fact finding in the state courts, entitle
the petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. 34 While defense counsel should
attempt the Sykes and Sawyer methods of avoiding default, she must also
realize that they are rarely successful.
Finally, federal courts have recognized that state procedural bars can
be unevenly and unjustly applied and have gone on to decide the merits
of claims in spite of failure to comply with state procedure. These claims
do not involve matters of jurisdiction and may receive federal review.
Neither the rule nor its application is independent and adequate if the state
applies a new procedural rule without notice or applies an existing rule
sporadically or in a surprisingly harsh or unexpected manner. Moreover,
the question of whether state procedural default precludes federal habeas
consideration is itself a federal question.
35
The following civil rights cases demonstrate various states' attempts
to preclude a specific class of unfavored litigants from obtaining federal
review. State courts attempted to achieve the desired result by relying
upon state default rules that were not observed with the same intensity in
cases involving other more favored groups.36 These cases further estab-
lish a federal review doctrine developed by the United States Supreme
Court which allows federal review of an otherwise defaulted claim when
the procedural rules relied upon to bar review are applied arbitrarily,
inconsistently or unevenly.
25 Murray, 477 U.S. at 488 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
486 (1953)).
26 Murray, 477 U.S. at 490.
27 Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. at 130.
28 United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)
29 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992); see case summary of Sawyer, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 18 (1992).
30 Sawyer at 2518.
31 Id. at 2517.
32 Murray, 477 U.S. at 495.
33 Id. at 538.
34 See generally Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 517 (1972).
35 Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965).
36 The actions of the states in the civil rights cases are closely anal-
ogous to the treatment given capital litigants by the appellate courts in
Virginia.
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Authority establishing the federal review doctrine is as follows:
James v. Kentucky,37 (only state procedural rules which are "finly
established and regularly followed.., can prevent implementation of fed-
eral constitutional rights"); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
38
(state court's refusal to review federal constitutional questions in a cer-
tiorari proceeding on the ground that mandamus was the proper mode of
obtaining review was without fair or substantial support, in view of the
inconsistency with prior holdings of that court, and hence was not such
an independent nonfederal ground as would deprive the United States
Supreme Court of jurisdiction to review the constitutional questions);
Hathorn v. Lovorn,39 (petitioner's reliance upon the Voting Rights Act
issue for the first time in their petition for rehearing may have been
untimely under a Mississippi procedural rule but did not constitute an
independent and adequate state ground barring the Court's review of the
federal question, where it appeared that, if Mississippi still followed such
a rule, it did not do so "strictly or regularly" 40); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama
ex rel. Flowers,4 1 (federal review not barred where the brief was found
to basically have complied with the Alabama procedural rule and the rule
had not previously been applied with such "pointless severity" 42); Barr
v. City of Columbia,4 3 (Supreme Court reiterated that it had "often point-
ed out that state procedural requirements which are not strictly or regu-
larly followed cannot deprive [the Court] of the right to review"44); and
Wheat v. Thigpen,45 (federal court could consider claims not raised by
habeas petitioner on direct appeal from capital murder conviction, where
state supreme court had not clearly announced or strictly or regularly fol-
lowed procedural rule which would have prevented petitioner from rais-
ing such claims on writ of error coram nobis).
46
Thus, a doctrine does exist that will permit federal review of default-
ed claims where the state rules are unevenly applied, not strictly or regu-
larly followed, or applied with "pointless severity". Recent use of the
doctrine in a capital context can be found in Ford v. Georgia,4 7 where a
black defendant was convicted of kidnapping, rape and murder, and he
appealed. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, and the defendant
37 466 U.S. 341 (1984).
38 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
39 457 U.S. 255 (1982).
4 0 Id. at 263.
41 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
42 Id. at 297.
43 378 U.S. 146 (1964).
44 Id. at 149 (citing N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377
U.S. 288 (1964); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958)).
45 793 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1986).
4 6 See Spencer v. Kemp, 781 F.2d 1458 (1lth Cir. 1986); Francois
'v. Wainwright, 741 F.2d 1275 (11th Cir. 1984). See also Wright v.
Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963).
47 498 U.S. 411 (1991).
48 Id. at 413.
49 Id. at 425. Originally a claim based on Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202 (1965), was made objecting to the use of peremptory strikes to
exclude blacks from the jury in case after case, over time. During the
pendency of the case, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), was
decided which rejected Swain's "crippling" burden of proof placed on
defendants. Batson held that a defendant could establish a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on
petitioned for certiorari. The Supreme Court granted the petition and
vacated and remanded for further consideration. On remand, the
Supreme Court of Georgia held that the defendant's equal protection
claim was procedurally barred as untimely under Georgia law.
4 8
Certiorari was granted to decide whether the rule of procedure laid down
by the Supreme Court of Georgia was an adequate and independent state
procedural ground that would bar review of petitioner's Batson claim4 9
that the State's exercise of its peremptory challenges rested on the imper-
missible ground of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 50 The Supreme Court held that the rule of pro-
cedure laid down by the Supreme Court of Georgia was not an adequate
and independent state procedural ground that would bar review of the
defendant's Batson claim because the rule was not firmly established at
the time in question.
51
There is evidence that Virginia's procedural bars are applied arbi-
trarily and inconsistently to preclude review of the claims of a class of
unfavored litigants-death sentenced prisoners-similar to the use of
procedural bars in the civil rights cases described here that established the
review doctrine. Therefore, it is time to confront Virginia's irrational
default rules directly through the provision of federal habeas law that also
allows defaulted claims to be heard if the state procedural rules have been
applied arbitrarily or inconsistently.
IV. CONFRONTING VIRGINIA'S DEFAULT RULES:
UNFAIR AND INCONSISTENT
When application of state procedural bars in Virginia is examined in
an attempt to identify deficiencies sufficient to permit federal review of
capital habeas claims, surprising findings appear. It might be concluded
that, where only property or liberty is at stake, or where the defendant is
a judge,52 procedural orderliness is not as paramount as it appears to be
in capital cases.53 In Virginia, it appears that appellate courts have often
overlooked state procedural default in noncapital cases. The following
evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges
at the defendant's trial. In Ford v. Georgia, supra, the defendant
changed his original Swain claim to a Batson claim and the state tried to
argue that this was a new claim and therefore defaulted. The Supreme
Court rejected the state's argument and recognized both claims were
challenging the purposeful exclusion of a class of jurors and that Batson
merely changed the burden of proof.
50 Ford, 498 U.S. at 418.
51 Id. at 425.
52 Campbell v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 988, 421 S.E.2d 652
(1992).
53 Granted most reversals under the "to attain the ends of justice"
exception to the default rules have come from the court of appeals.
Nonetheless, the supreme court is supposed to be applying the same lan-
guage. See note 54, infra. It is not enough, then, for the supreme court to
claim that they are limited by procedural rules when the court of appeals
is not so limited in its application of the same language. Futhermore, on
direct appeal, capital cases must go to the supreme court while other
cases go to the court of appeals. To the extent that the court of appeals is
applying the same language to reverse but the supreme court is not, the
rules are being applied arbitrarily and more harshly to the detriment of
death sentenced prisoners.
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cases 54 demonstrate the various types of noncapital situations in which
Virginia appellate courts have heard defaulted claims, as well as,
reversed criminal and civil judgments in order to "attain the ends of jus-
tice".
55
In Campbell v. Commonwealth,56 the defendant, a judge, was con-
victed of forging a public record. The jury was instructed on an incorrect
statement of law. At trial, however, the defendant did not object to the
instruction. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury. The prosecution argued that review of the claim was
barred under Rule 5A: 18 because the defendant did not preserve for
appeal his objection to the jury instruction. Nonetheless, the court of
appeals heard the issue and reversed the judgment "to attain the ends of
justice" because the error was "patently harmful" and "contrary to fun-
damental notions of justice.
' 57
In Brown v. Commonwealth,5 8 the defendant was convicted of three
counts of uttering forged checks in violation of Virginia Code section
18.2-172. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to support the convictions for uttering. The Commonwealth
argued that review of the claim was barred by Rule 5A:18 because the
defendant failed to argue at trial the specific issues raised on appeal: that
the elements of knowledge and intent to defraud were lacking. Despite
the defendant's failure to raise the issue at trial, the Virginia Court of
Appeals invoked the Rule 5A: 18 "to attain the ends of justice" exception
and reversed on insufficient evidence grounds.
In Jimenez v. Commonwealth,59 the defendant was convicted on an
indictment charging that he obtained advances of money with fraudulent
intent upon a promise to construct a building and that he failed or refused
to perform the promise in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-200.1.
On appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and
the granting of a jury instruction despite his failure properly to preserve
the alleged error at trial. The prosecution argued that the defendant
waived his right to raise the issues on appeal because he failed to preserve
the error at trial. The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the prosecu-
tion's argument and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. The
court invoked the "to attain the ends of justice" provision of Rule 5:25
because the instruction omitted essential elements of the offense, and
therefore, no evidence was produced relating to those elements.
In Duck v. Commonwealth,60 the defendant was convicted of dri-
ving under the influence (second offense) in violation of Virginia Code
section 18.2-266. On appeal, the defendant claimed, for the first time,
that his conviction violated his due process rights because his act of
invoking his right to appeal resulted in the Commonwealth alleging a
54 The cases described in this section do not constitute an exhaustive
ist. They are merely representative of noncapital cases in which claims
lave been heard despite default. Other cases include: M.E.D. v. J.P.M, 3
Va. App. 391, 350 S.E.2d 215 (1986) (court considered grounds for
idmissibility of evidence that were not presented to trial court "to attain
he ends of justice); Chrisman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 371, 349
;.E.2d 899 (1986) (court considered the sufficiency of the evidence to
ustain a sodomy conviction "to attain the ends of justice"); Reed v.
7ommonwealth, 6 Va. App. 65, 366 S.E.2d 274 (1988) (defendant's fail-
ire to properly preserve issue of sufficiency of evidence did not preclude
.ppellate review of defendant's criminal trespass conviction under "ends
Pfjustice" exception); and Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 126, 380
.E.2d 8 (1989) ("ends of justice" exception to contemporaneous objec-
ion rules permitted appellate review of error arising when trial court mis-
akenly sentenced defendant for burglary other than one for which he was
onvicted, where trial court considered facts of other burglary in impos-
ig sentence).
55 Va. R. Sup. Ct. 5:25; Va. R. Ct. App. 5A:18. The virtually iden-
,cal court of appeals rule in pertinent part provides as follows:
more serious offense against him. The defendant argued that the trial
court erred in allowing the amendment of the warrant to allege a "second
offense." The Commonwealth argued that the claim was barred by Rule
5A:18 because the defendant failed to raise the issue before the trial court.
The defendant conceded that he failed to raise a due process objection in
the trial court but argued that he satisfied the mandate of Rule 5A: 18 by
objecting to the amendment of the warrant on other grounds. The court
of appeals found that the claim was not preserved. Nonetheless, the court
considered the claim in order "to attain the ends of justice." The court
relied on Cooper v. Commonwealth61 for the proposition that "[a]n appel-
late court may ... take cognizance of errors though not assigned when
they relate to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, are fun-
damental, or when such review is essential to avoid grave injustice or pre-
vent the denial of essential rights." 62 The court invoked the saving pro-
vision of Rule 5A:18 because the claim involved the denial of a funda-
mental constitutional right, that of due process.
In Miller v. Commonwealth,63 the defendant was convicted of felo-
niously failing to return property. On appeal, the defendant claimed, for
the first time, that the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to be
brought into the courtroom in shackles in view of the jury panel and in
failing to declare a mistrial. The Commonwealth argued that appellate
consideration of the claim was barred by Rule 5A:18 because the defen-
dant failed to contemporaneously object in the trial court. The court
found that no objection was made prior to the jury being sworn but had
difficulty determining when defense counsel became aware of the exis-
tence of the shackles prior to that time. Nevertheless, the appellate court
reviewed the claim under the "to attain the ends of justice" exception to
Rule 5A:18 and stated that "[w]here so fundamental a right as a fair and
impartial trial is at issue, we will not assume that counsel delayed raising
a timely objection." 64
In Miller v. Miller,65 the appellant appealed the trial court's order
reducing the amount of monthly child support the appellee must pay for
his retarded son. The trial judge gave no written explanation or justifica-
tion for his decision. When appellant's attorney was presented the draft
order reducing child support for his endorsement, he signed it, "seen and
objected to." Otherwise, he made no objection to the trial court's reduc-
ing the amount of child support without having made written findings as
to why the amount was determined. The appellee contended that the
appellant failed to preserve for appeal the issue whether the trial court
erred in entering its child support reduction order without making written
findings, because she failed to object pursuant to Rule 5A:18 at the trial
court's ruling or order on that ground. The court of appeals reviewed the
No ruling of the trial court ... will be considered as a
basis for reversal unless the objection was stated together with
the grounds therefor at the time of the ruling, except for good
cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to obtain the
ends of justice.
(emphasis added)
56 Campbell v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 988, 421 S.E.2d 652
(1992) (en banc).
57 Id. at 995,421 S.E.2d at 656.
58 1993 WL 230063 (Va. App.).
59 241 Va. 244, 402 S.E.2d 678 (1991).
60 8 Va. App. 567, 383 S.E.2d 746 (1989).
61 205 Va. 883, 140 S.E.2d 688 (1965).
62 Duck, 8 Va. App. at 570, 383 S.E.2d at 748 (citing Cooper, 205
Va. at 889, 140 S.E.2d at 693).
63 7 Va. App. 367, 373 S.E.2d 721 (1988).
64 Id. at 371, 373 S.E.2d at 723.
65 1993 WL 544878 (Va. App.).
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trial court's action "to attain the ends of justice." It did so, however, not
because the trial court necessarily erred in reducing the amount of support
or erred in the manner in which it did so, but rather because the entry of
a support order without any written findings as to why the guideline
amount is unjust or inappropriate and without justifying the deviation
would not provide an adequate basis for setting support in the future.
In Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of America, v. Covenant Coal
Corp.,66 the unions appealed from orders which held them in contempt
for violating an injunction prohibiting certain strike-related activities.
The unions claimed that the trial court improperly imposed criminal con-
tempt fines on them in violation of their constitutional protections. The
unions, however, failed to make a contemporaneous or specific objection
in the trial court on these grounds. Nonetheless, "to attain the ends of jus-
tice" the court addressed the issue for the first time on appeal and
reversed. The appellate court found that the trial court imposed the crim-
inal fines based on a burden of proof other than guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Therefore, the court held that the unions were "denied their con-
stitutional protections, which are mandated when a party is subjected to
criminal penalties."
67
In Roane v. Roane,6 8 on appeal following a divorce action, the wife
appeared pro se, filed no brief, and alleged no error. The husband had
appealed asserting that the evidence was not sufficient to support the trial
court's finding that corporate stock had been transmuted to marital prop-
erty. The appellate court found error during its examination of the record.
The court discovered that the trial court had failed to respond to the wife's
request that it consider some proffered exhibits and a closer review of the
husband's assertion that no guaranty existed. Despite the wife's failure
to file a brief and assign error, the appellate court considered errors "to
attain the ends of justice" and, sua sponte, found error in the trial court's
failure to admit the proffered exhibits.
69
66 12 Va. App. 135, 402 S.E.2d 906 (1991).
67 Id. at 149, 402 S.E.2d at 914.
68 12 Va. App. 989, 407 S.E.2d 689 (1991).
69 Id. at 994, 407 S.E.2d at 701.
70 221 Va. 754, 273 S.E.2d 790 (1981).
Unlike the noncapital cases, however, where the life of a prisoner is
at stake, the Supreme Court of Virginia has overlooked procedural default
"to attain the ends of justice" only once. In Ball v. Commonwealth,
70
the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the capital murder conviction of
the defendant because the defendant had been convicted of a crime of
which, under the evidence, he could not properly be found guilty. In Ball,
the defendant was convicted of murder in the commission of robbery
while armed with a deadly weapon under Virginia Code section 18.2-
31(4), which at that time allowed conviction of capital murder only for
"robbery," not "attempted robbery."7 1 The defendant had not raised this
issue at trial. The Commonwealth argued that review of the claim was
barred under Rule 5:21 (now Rule 5:25). Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court of Virginia invoked the "to attain the ends of justice" exception.
The court found that in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
the evidence showed that the victim was killed during an attempted rob-
bery rather than in the actual commission of a robbery. At that time, the
most that the defendant could be convicted of was felony murder under
Virginia Code section 18.2-32.
V. CONCLUSION
Researching and attacking the bias against death sentenced prisoners
demonstrated by the Virginia courts in the application of state procedur-
al bars is an underutilized tool of appellate defense practice. Given the
growing use of other doctrines to close the doors of federal court,7 2 con-
fronting Virginia's default rules directly deserves more attention. After
all, before getting caught up in this legal game playing it is worthwhile to
ask as a matter of policy and justice whether absolute procedural order is
a value that should be elevated above protection against execution of pris-
oners whose trials have been infected by fundamental constitutional error.
71 The legislature promptly changed the statute to include "attempt-
ed" robbery.
72 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302 (1989) (adopting no-retroactivity principle in the context of
capital habeas proceedings).
JUSTICE BLACKMUN AND THE "FAILED EXPERIMENT"
BY: WILLIAM S. GEIMER
On February 22, 1994, a symbolic but important event occurred. It
merits at least passing mention as Virginia, now third among all states in
carrying out executions in modem times,1 continues to struggle with the
administration of its capital murder statutes. In a dissent from the Court's
denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins,2 Supreme Court Justice Harry
Blackmun announced that he would no longer vote to sustain any death
sentences. The announcement is merely symbolic in the sense that Justice
Blackmun currently stands alone among court members in taking that
position. But because of who Justice Blackmun is and the unique oppor-
1 Death Row USA, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Spring 1994.
tunity which he has had to watch the modem death penalty in action, his
explanation for his change in position deserves to be read and thought-
fully considered.
This brief essay is written in the hope that it will prompt all con-
cemed with the administration of Virginia's death penalty-judges, pros-
ecutors, defense counsel, legislators-to read his opinion in its entirety.
Justice Blackmun was appointed by President Nixon. He came to
the Court with a deeply held personal antipathy for the death penalty, but
with a clear understanding of his role as one of the ultimate arbiters of the
2 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994).
